
Waste & Hazardous Materials
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act - Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act - Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) (42 U.S.C. ch. 82 § 6901 et seq.)
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) was created as an amendment to the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965—which was the first federal statute that regulated the disposal of solid waste. The RCRA’s main objectives were—as its name implies—to reduce waste and therefore conserve resources, protect human health, and prevent environmental harm caused by toxic waste disposal. The RCRA is monitored and managed by states and state environmental protection agencies once approval has been received from the Environmental Protection Agency. The Act gives the government—both federal and state—the responsibility to manage hazardous waste from “cradle-to-grave”. It provides important definitions for terms like solid waste, hazardous waste (which can be ignitable, corrosive, or reactive), and waste streams. It sets design and operational requirements for incinerators, landfills, and hazardous waste storing and handling equipment. The Act creates liability for entities that produce waste. Finally, the Act implements a permitting system for bodies that treat, manage, transport, or create hazardous waste in order to ensure there are funds available for potential future cleanups.
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42 USCS §6901 is the public law that governs the recovery and disposal of solid waste in the United States. The RCRC finds that as a result of technological advancement, economic growth, and population growth has resulted in the increase of mass and the change of characteristics of solid waste. As urban area population growth increases, they are faced with serious, financial, management, intergovernmental, and technical problems in the disposal of waste. While solid waste collection and disposal should remain the primary function of State and local agencies, the issue of solid waste management has reached national scope. Federal action should take place to improve methods to reduce the mass of solid waste and unsalvageable materials that get discarded and to provide proper and economical solid waste disposal practices.
Congress finds that most solid waste is disposed of on land in open dumps and sanitary landfills, even though land is a valuable natural resource and that disposal of solid waste hazardous waste can present a danger to human health and the environment if not managed properly. As a result of the Clean Air Act, the Water Pollution Control Act, and other federal and State laws have resulted in the creation of solid waste. Similarly, inadequate practices of the use and disposal of solid waste have created adverse effects on water, air, and other parts of the environment and public health. Open dumping poses a particular threat to health since it pollutes drinking water from underground and surface supplies and pollutes the land and air. Inadequate hazardous waste disposal poses a significant threat to health and the environment. Once improper action is taken, corrective action is expensive and time-consuming. Reliance on land disposal should be minimized or eliminated because certain classes of land disposal facilities are not capable of assuring long-term containment of certain hazardous wastes. Alternative methods of land disposal must be developed since most US cities will run out of land disposal sites in the next 5 years.
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Link to the case: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/connecticut/ctdce/3:2021cv00932/145182/122/
Link to the United States Code (2023 edition): https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCODE-2023-title42/USCODE-2023-title42-chap82
Please note that the following brief was prepared by a student.
Parties: The plaintiff is Conservation Law Foundation, Inc. and the defendant is Gulf Oil Limited Partnership.
Procedural History: Plaintiff Conservation Law Foundation, Inc. has brought this action against Defendant Gulf Oil Limited Partnership, alleging that Defendant is violating federal law by failing to prepare its bulk petroleum [*2] storage facility in New Haven, Connecticut for severe flooding and other weather-related risks that are increasing in severity due to climate change. The complaint consists of eighteen counts; counts sixteen to eighteen allege violations of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 6901 et seq.
Facts: Defendant owns and operates on a bulk petroleum storage terminal in New Haven, Connecticut. Plaintiff is a non-profit organization with more than 5,000 members. Some of these members live near and regularly visit, use, and enjoy the area and waters near the Terminal. Plaintiff's members are concerned about eliminating risks from the discharge and release of pollutants from the Terminal into nearby waters, communities, and ecosystems. Plaintiffs are concerned that climate change in New Haven increases vulnerability in flooding and storm surges that may lead to future risk of pollution of the defendant's terminal into waters. Defendant's operation of the Terminal is also regulated under RCRA because it generates hazardous waste. Several toxic and hazardous wastes and pollutants, including petroleum hydrocarbons, are present at the Terminal, and many of these substances are highly carcinogenic.
Issue: Should the court apply the Resource Conservation And Recovery Act to determine whether the defendant violated the plaintiff?
Holding: Yes
Reasoning: The court decided to dismiss allegations against the defendant because of the plaintiff’s lack of standing and failure to allege injury or give sufficient evidence of violation of the Resource Conservation And Recovery Act. More specifically, Plaintiff's complaint in this case is devoid of any allegations articulating how the impacts of climate change, including the threat of a foreseeable weather event, present a real and immediate risk of a discharge of pollutants by Defendant's Terminal into the waters Plaintiff's members enjoy.
Dissenting Opinion: None
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42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1) is commonly referenced as the citizen suit provision. RCRA regulates the management and disposal of solid and hazardous waste to protect human health and the environment. Section 6972(a)(1) allows private individuals or organizations to file civil actions against any person, including governmental bodies, alleged to be in violation of waste handling regulations, or contributing to the handling or transportation of waste that may pose an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment.
This provision creates a mechanism for public enforcement when regulatory agencies fail to act. In Cal. River Watch v. City of Vacaville, for example, the plaintiff brought suit under § 6972(a)(1)(B), arguing that the city was contributing to the transportation of hazardous waste through its water system. The case raised questions about how broadly the term “transportation” could be interpreted under RCRA and whether the city’s passive distribution of contaminated groundwater could qualify under the statute’s enforcement trigger.
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Link to the case: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/07/01/20-16605.pdf
Link to the United States Code (2023 edition): https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCODE-2023-title42/USCODE-2023-title42-chap82-subchapVII-sec6972&collectionCode=USCODE
Please note that the following brief was prepared by a student.
Heading: Cal. River Watch v. City of Vacaville, 39 F.4th 624 (2021)
a. Plaintiff: California River Watch
b. Defendant: City of Vacaville
c. Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Facts: California River Watch, a nonprofit organization, as the plaintiff, is suing the City of Vacaville, California as the defendant. River Watch claims that the City is violating the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), which allows any person to sue an entity contributing to the transportation of dangerous solid waste. The core of the claim is that the City's water wells are contaminated by hexavalent chromium, a human carcinogen known to cause significant health risks, including cancer. River Watch alleges this carcinogen being transported to the City's residents through its water distribution system.
From approximately 1972 to 1982, companies like Pacific Wood Preserving and Wickes Forest Industries, Inc., operated wood treatment facilities near Elmira, California. Waste products from these companies commonly contained hexavalent chromium. Wickes Forest Industries, specifically, is known to have dumped a massive amount of hexavalent chromium into the ground near Elmira at a location referred to as the Wickes site. As a result, the Wickes site was identified and listed as a federal hazardous waste site in 1980. Several years later, the site was found to have contaminated three nearby drinking-water wells, including one at Elmira Elementary School. Samples from the site at that time revealed hexavalent chromium levels thousands of times greater than California's public health goals. River Watch contends that this hexavalent chromium has since migrated through groundwater from the Wickes site to the Elmira Well Field, where the city draws much of its water. Eight of the City's eleven wells are in this field.
River Watch charges that the City is "transporting and discharging water containing high amounts of hexavalent chromium" in a manner dangerous to residents. They sued under the RCRA, alleging the City is contributing to the transportation of hexavalent chromium, which is claimed to be a "solid waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment". River Watch argues the hexavalent chromium is solid waste because it is discarded material resulting from industrial operations, specifically highlighting the Wickes site as the likely source. Vacaville argued that hexavalent chromium is naturally occurring and therefore cannot constitute a "discarded material," which is a central dispute in the case. The City also argued that its movement of the waste through the water supply is coincidental and does not constitute transportation as defined by RCRA, which the City argues requires a direct connection to the waste disposal process.
Procedural History: This is an appeal by the plaintiffs from the district court. In which, both parties moved for summary judgments – a judgement for one party against another without a full trial. The district court granted the City’s motion for summary judgement and denied the California River Watch’s motion on the basis that the River Watch had not adequately demonstrated how the City’s activities constituted discarding solid waste under the RCRA. The district court reasoned that the RCRA’s requirement that the contaminant be “discarded” was not met. Following the district court’s decision California River Watch appealed and the case was moved to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for review of the district court’s summary judgment.
Legal Issue: Did the hexavalent chromium found in the municipal water system in Vacaville mean that the city could be found liable as a “transporter (…) who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment” under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act as stated in 42 U.S.C. §6972(a)(1)?
Holding: No. The pumping of contaminated groundwater through the City’s municipal system did not meet the specific definition of “transportation” provided in the RCRA.
Reasoning: Reviewing River Watch's arguments and evidence, particularly concerning the origin of the hexavalent chromium from facilities like Wickes2, the appellate court determined that the substance could indeed be considered "discarded material". They reasoned that if, as River Watch's expert suggested, the chemical was released into the environment as leftover waste, abandoned and cast aside after industrial processes, rather than through normal use or wear and tear, it fits the definition of material that has served its intended purpose and is no longer wanted. So, the appellate court concluded that River Watch had presented sufficient evidence to create a factual dispute, or a triable issue, regarding whether the hexavalent chromium was "discarded material". However, despite finding a triable issue on the "discarded material" element, the appellate court ultimately upheld the dismissal of the case based on a different requirement to be found liable under the RCRA’s endangerment provision: whether the City was "contributing to the past or present . . . transportation" of solid or hazardous waste.
River Watch argued that the City's act of pumping contaminated water through its distribution system constituted transportation. However, the appellate court found that interpreting "transportation" simply as moving something from one place to another, based on its literal dictionary meaning, was not sufficient within the specific context of RCRA. They emphasized that the meaning of a term must also be understood through the broader
structure and other provisions of the statute.
By examining other sections of RCRA, including those detailing requirements for "transporters" related to manifests, permits, and the movement of waste to specific facilities, the court concluded that the term "transportation" within the RCRA framework has a more specialized meaning. In the RCRA, the court found, “transportation” refers to the active movement of waste that is directly linked to the waste disposal process, such as shipping waste to a location for treatment, storage, or disposal. The appellate court found that the City's action of drawing groundwater and distributing it through its system, even if it contained hexavalent chromium that had migrated there, did not possess this necessary connection to the waste disposal process. Because the City was not moving the substance as part of a waste disposal activity, its actions were determined not to constitute "transportation" as defined by RCRA in this context, leading to the affirmance of the summary judgment from the district court.
Dissenting Opinion: None.
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The RCRA defines solid waste as garbage that can either be solids, liquids, or contained gasses. Importantly in 39 F. 4th 624, the definition of solid wastes include discarded materials. Hazardous waste is defined as anything that is ignitable: alcohols, aerosol can reside, solvents, corrosive: drain cleaners, ruse removers, and water treatment chemicals, or reactive: cyanides, sulfides, compressed gasses, or materials that react with water. In 1984, the RCRA was amended with the Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments (HSWA) which required phasing out the land disposal of hazardous waste.
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Link to the case: https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/07/01/20-16605.pdf
Link to the United States Code (2023 edition): https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCODE-2023-title42/USCODE-2023-title42-chap82-subchapVII-sec6972&collectionCode=USCODE
Please note that the following brief was prepared by a student.
Heading: Cal. River Watch v. City of Vacaville, 39 F.4th 624 (9th Cir. 2021)
Plaintiff: California River Watch
Defendant: City of Vacaville
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Facts: California River Watch, a nonprofit environmental organization, sued the City of Vacaville under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). The organization alleged that the City was violating RCRA by contributing to the transportation of hazardous solid waste—specifically, hexavalent chromium, a known human carcinogen.
According to River Watch, the hexavalent chromium originated from historical industrial activity near Elmira, California. From the 1970s to the early 1980s, companies such as Pacific Wood Preserving and Wickes Forest Industries operated wood treatment facilities that released large amounts of hexavalent chromium. The Wickes site was designated a federal hazardous waste site in 1980 after testing revealed contamination levels thousands of times above California's public health goals.
River Watch claimed the contaminant migrated through groundwater to the Elmira Well Field, which supplies most of the City’s drinking water. They argued that by distributing this water, the City was effectively transporting hazardous waste in violation of RCRA.
Vacaville countered that the chromium was naturally occurring and not a “discarded material” under RCRA. They also argued that passive movement through the water supply did not qualify as “transportation” under the statute.
Procedural History: Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to the City, finding that River Watch had not shown how the City’s actions constituted the transportation or disposal of solid waste under RCRA. The court concluded that RCRA’s requirement of “discarded material” had not been satisfied.
River Watch appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, seeking reversal of the district court’s ruling.
Legal Issue: Does the presence of hexavalent chromium in the municipal water system make the City liable under RCRA as a transporter of hazardous waste presenting imminent and substantial endangerment?
Holding: No. The Ninth Circuit held that the City’s distribution of groundwater—even if contaminated—did not meet the statutory definition of “transportation” under RCRA.
Reasoning: The appellate court acknowledged that hexavalent chromium could be considered “discarded material” if it was released as industrial waste. River Watch presented sufficient evidence to raise a factual dispute on that point.
However, the case ultimately hinged on the interpretation of “transportation” under RCRA. The court concluded that the term refers to active, regulated movement of waste, typically involving permits, manifests, and transport to treatment or disposal sites. The City’s delivery of drinking water—even if containing contaminants—did not fit this definition, as it was not part of a waste disposal operation.
Therefore, the court upheld the district court’s ruling in favor of the City.
Dissenting Opinion: None.

Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA)
The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA) was passed in 1986, as part of the broader Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA Title III). The EPCRA emerged as a direct response to growing concerns about chemical hazards in American communities. The legislation was passed largely in response to the catastrophic chemical leak in Bhopal, India, in 1984, which resulted in thousands of deaths and injuries. This disaster revealed a critical gap in public awareness and emergency preparedness regarding chemical storage and releases, not only abroad but within the United States. Thus, the EPCRA was designed to enhance community safety by improving transparency concerning chemical hazards and by facilitating more effective emergency planning at the local level (U.S.Environmental Protection Agency [EPA], 2023).
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While the EPCRA imposes extensive reporting and emergency planning obligations on facilities that use hazardous chemicals, it also contains several exemptions that limit the scope of its reach. One of the most significant exemptions is found in 42 U.S.C. §11047. This provision exempts from the EPCRA’s requirements “the transportation, including the storage incident to such transportation,” of any chemical substance regulated under the Act.
The exemption also applies to the transportation and distribution of natural gas. Congress included §11047 to avoid duplicating regulations already governed by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), particularly those concerning the safety of hazardous materials during transport. The statutory language makes clear that the EPCRA is not intended to regulate chemicals that are in active transit, including brief periods of temporary storage that are part of the transportation process such as layovers or refueling stops.
This transportation exemption is not a blanket exclusion. Rather, it applies only to situations where the chemical substances are genuinely in the process of being transported and any storage is directly incidental to that transportation. If hazardous materials are being stored at a fixed location for operational convenience, or have been removed from the active stream of commerce (such as being disconnected from motive power or lacking shipping documentation) they may no longer qualify for the exemption. In such instances, the EPCRA’s core provisions, including reporting and emergency planning obligations, may apply.
It is also important to note that §11047 does not override §11004, which governs emergency notification requirements in the event of an accidental release of a hazardous substance. This ensures that even during transportation, if a significant release occurs, state and local authorities must be notified immediately to safeguard public health.
Section 11047 plays a narrow but crucial role in the overall structure of the EPCRA. It protects the efficiency of the transportation sector by excluding regulated substances in active transit from redundant oversight, while ensuring that substances stored at fixed sites for longer periods remain subject to community right-to-know requirements. The provision ultimately reflects the EPCRA’s broader goal: empowering local communities with access to information about hazardous chemicals in their vicinity and ensuring preparedness in the event of an emergency.
Works Cited
United States v. Multistar Indus., 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 31236, 2024 WL 5055552 (United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, December 10, 2024, Filed), available at https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-3765/23-3765-2024-12-10.html
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. (2023). Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA). https://www.epa.gov/epcra/what-epcra
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Link to the case: https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca9/23-3765/23-3765-2024-12-10.html
Link to the United States Code (2023 edition): https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCODE-2023-title42/USCODE-2023-title42-chap116-subchapIII-sec11047&collectionCode=USCODE
Please note that the following brief was prepared by a student.
Heading: United States v. Multistar Indus., 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 31236 (9th Cir. 2024)
Plaintiff: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Defendant: MULTISTAR INDUSTRIES, INC.
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Facts: Multistar Industries stored railcars containing trimethylamine (TMA), a hazardous chemical regulated under the Clean Air Act (CAA) and the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), on private property. They did not take required safety and notification measures, as the company claimed the TMA railcars were exempt from these measures because they were “in transportation.” However, the cars were stationary, disconnected from locomotive power, lacked active shipping papers, and were stored for periods exceeding one month.
Procedural History: The United States sued Multistar in district court, alleging that Multistar violated EPCRA reporting requirements and the CAA’s Risk Management Program. The court granted summary judgement for the government, rejected Multistar’s transportation exemption defense, held a bench trial on penalties, and imposed a $850,000 civil fine. Multistar appealed.
Legal Issue: Did the Ninth Circuit determine that Multistar Industries’ storage of hazardous substances qualified for the “transportation in commerce” exemption under 42 U.S.C. §11047?
Holding: No. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that Multistar was not entitled to the transportation exemption. The court found that the chemicals were not “in commerce” or “in transit”, but rather being stored at a fixed facility and were under Multistar’s direct control, not that of a carrier. Therefore, the reporting and planning requirements applied under the EPCRA.
Rationale: The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the “transportation in commerce” exemption under 42 U.S.C. §11047 applies only when hazardous substances are genuinely in transit or temporarily stored in a manner incidental to movement in commerce. In this case, the railcars containing trimethylamine (TMA) were parked on private property for extended periods, disconnected from locomotive power, and lacked active shipping papers. The court determined that such conditions indicated the chemicals were not in active transportation, but instead under Multistar’s direct control at a stationary facility.
The court emphasized that the term “transportation” must be narrowly construed in line with the statute’s public safety purpose. It agreed with the Environmental Protection Agency’s interpretation that once a hazardous material is no longer actively in transit, it becomes subject to stationary source requirements. The presence or absence of motive power and the possession of current shipping papers were key indicators in determining whether the materials were still “in commerce.” Because the TMA was stored for over a month and not actively being shipped, the court found that the railcars had effectively become part of a stationary facility.
The court rejected Multistar’s claim that the mere placement of the TMA in railcars triggered the transportation exemption, explaining that such an interpretation would defeat the purpose of EPCRA’s emergency planning provisions. It concluded that allowing companies to circumvent reporting duties by nominally using transportation containers (even when the chemicals are not moving) would create a regulatory loophole inconsistent with the statute’s design. Finally, the court upheld the $850,000 civil penalty imposed by the district court, finding that it was properly calculated based on the number of discrete violations. The court’s decision reinforces the principle that EPCRA’s reporting and safety mandates apply fully when hazardous substances are stored in non-transportation contexts, and that regulated entities must adhere to those requirements.
Dissenting Opinion: None.

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), also known as the Superfund Law, is a federal law that addresses the release of hazardous substances threatening public health and the environment and their cleanup. CERCLA identifies responsible parties and holds them liable for the costs of cleaning up at contaminated sites.
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Between the 1970s and 1980s, there was a growing concern over the hazardous waste at abandoned sites nationwide. In particular, the Love Canal Disaster stirred concern as toxic chemicals from a landfill contaminated soil, groundwater, and homes. In 1978, President Jimmy Carter ordered the relocation of families in the area with the help of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“From Superfund”, 2020). The severity of the contamination from the Love Canal Disaster, both economically and environmentally, propelled Congress to pass CERCLA in 1980 to regulate the disposal of hazardous waste (“From Superfund”, 2020). As a way of strengthening the provision under CERCLA, the EPA was authorized to identify and clean up contaminated sites and granted the power to respond to potential health threats from the release of hazardous substances.
Under CERCLA, there are four categories of individuals who are considered potentially responsible parties (PRPs). These include the current and past owners and operators of a vessel or facility where hazardous substances are released. As well as any entities that arranged waste disposal and transporters who selected disposal sites.
Furthermore, CERCLA provides two types of cleanup actions. The first one is short-term removals for immediate threats like chemical spills. The second type concerns long-term remedial actions for severe contamination at locations on the National Priorities List. All cleanup plans under CERCLA must follow the National Contingency Plan (NCP), the federal guidelines for preparedness, response, and removal actions.
Additionally, liability under CERCLA is: 1) strict; 2) retroactive; and 3) typically joint and several. Notably, CERCLA does not automatically mandate joint and several liability, however, the courts have traditionally imposed it (Kirsch, p.10). As a result, all potentially responsible parties bear the brunt of the cleanup costs when the harm cannot be divided accurately. When harm is divisible, the court may allow apportionment, but this is rare. Joint and several liability is particularly useful for the government as it allows it to recover costs even if some PRPs cannot be found.
In regard to funding these cleanup costs, CERCLA would tax the chemical and petroleum industries. This tax ended in 1995, and since then, the funds have been used to cover cleanup costs when PRPs cannot be found. Congress later passed the 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) to mandate the EPA to inform communities about cleanup plans and receive feedback (“From Superfund”, 2020).
Works Cited
Kirsch, Laurence, and John Raffetto. Federal Environmental Liability under CERCLA and RCRA, www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba-cms-dotorg/products/inv/book/408778006/chap1-5350266.pdf. Accessed 5 May 2025.
(May 2, 2020 Saturday). From Superfund to Brownfields: An Environmental Success Story, 40 Years in the Making. Impact News Service. https://advance.lexis.com/api/document?collection=news&id=urn%3acontentItem%3a5YTR-11F1-JDG9-Y238-00000-00&context=1519360&identityprofileid=GZVX8R51690.
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Link to the United States Code (2023 edition): https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCODE-2023-title42/USCODE-2023-title42-chap103-subchapI-sec9607&collectionCode=USCODE
Please note that the following brief was prepared by a student.
Heading: APL Co. Pte. Ltd. v. Kemira Water Solutions, Inc., 999 F. Supp. 2d 590
Parties: The plaintiffs are APL Co. Pte. Ltd. ("APL") and its insurers. APL is a global transportation and logistics company that is the carrier of hazardous cargo. The defendant is Kemira Water Solutions, Inc. ("Kemira"), the end purchaser and consignee of the ferrous chloride. Fairyland Envitech Co. Ltd. ("Fairyland"), a Taiwanese company, was the supplier of the ferrous chloride. Fairyland could not be located and thus is not a party to the judgment in this case.
Facts: On August 3, 2006, Kemira and Fairyland entered into a purchase agreement under which Kemira agreed to purchase ferrous chloride crystal from Fairyland, and Fairyland agreed to ship the chemical from Taiwan to California. Kemira had contracted Fairyland to purchase the ferrous chloride and directed Fairyland to use bottom-unloading bulk bags to transport the ferrous chloride crystals in the purchase agreement. The purchase agreement directed Fairyland on how to package and ship the ferrous chloride crystal. APL was the carrier of the two ferrous chloride crystal shipments aboard the Hyundai Independence and the APL Singapore. In the fall of 2006, the bags leaked while being transported aboard. The Hyundai Independence was carrying 22 containers of ferrous chloride crystal, shipped in 412 separate bags. Whereas, the APL Singapore was carrying 29 containers of ferrous chloride crystal, shipped in 530 separate bags. The leakage of ferrous chloride crystals from the bulk bags had contaminated the containers, ships, and ports where they were discharged. Ferrous chloride crystal is a hazardous chemical classified as "Class 8: Corrosive" under the International Maritime Dangerous Goods ("IMDG") Code. Cleanup and response efforts lasted more than seven months, and APL incurred $5,020,169.88 in cleanup and response costs over the leakage.
Procedural History: On August 27, 2009, APL and its insurers filed an admiralty and maritime action in the Northern District of California against Kemira and Fairyland for breach of contract, negligence, and recovery under CERCLA. APL and its insurers filed against Kemira because they incurred cleanup and response costs as a result of ferrous chloride crystal leakage from the two shipments. The case was then transferred to the Southern District of New York in 2011 and then transferred to the undersigned on November 8, 2011. On August 22, 2012, this Court granted Kemira summary judgment on APL's breach of contract and negligence claims but not on APL's CERCLA claim.
Legal Issue: Is Kemira Water Solutions liable under 42 U.S.C. § 9607, a provision of CERCLA, for reimbursing APL for response costs over the leakage of the ferrous chloride crystals?
Holding: Yes, Kemira Water Solutions is liable under 42 U.S.C. §9607 for reimbursing APL for response costs over the leakage of the ferrous chloride crystals as the following criteria is true: 1) there was a threatened release of hazardous materials at a facility; 2) APL incurred response costs; 3) the response costs were necessary and consistent with the NCP; 4) Kemira fits the the criteria of a potentially responsible party.
Reasoning: In the August 22, 2012, summary judgment decision, the court found criteria one and four to be true. To reiterate, the court found that the bulk bags being used to package and ship the ferrous chloride crystals were the site and thus “facility” of the release or threatened release of hazardous materials (p. 618). In that summary judgment, the court also found that Kemira fit the definition of an operator, an entity at least directing or influencing how waste is disposed of or handled, under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3). The court referenced how Kemira outlined the shipping and packaging instructions for the ferrous chloride crystals in Schedule A of the Purchase Agreement (p. 598). The court then used this Schedule A to establish that Kemira had “by contract” arranged for the “transport for treatment of hazardous materials” and therefore had influence, albeit not physical control, over the transport of the ferrous chloride crystals. With the operator definition being fulfilled, the court established that Kemira was a potentially responsible party under the provision 42 U.S.C. § 9607 of CERCLA.
Concerning the second criterion, the court held, without any dispute, that there were response costs as the facts of the case indicate that APL spent over 5 million dollars responding to the toxic leakage. To reason the third criterion, the court explained how “necessary” response costs are not just those that “contain” and “clean up” hazardous releases but also any costs associated with “investigation, planning, and remedial design” (p. 619). The court initially found that since APL's decisions over cleanup and response operations descended from a thoughtful analysis and consensus among a diverse group of experienced professionals, the costs were not wasteful and cost-effective. Furthermore, the court noted that the APL and its contractors had focused on mitigating the threat to human health, and thus made necessary expenses by: 1) taking action in a reasonable, timely manner when the ferrous chloride leaked on the vessel, the ports, and then the containment; 2) repacking the ferrous chloride and attempting to deliver it to Kemira to get rid of chemicals from the terminal and reduce harm for people (p. 620). It is to be noted that the defendant summoned, Dr. Dagdigian, an expert as to the adequacy and reasonableness of the cleanup and response efforts for both shipments of ferrous chloride under CERCLA. However, his testimony lacked experience relevant to the facts, had an incomplete understanding of the factual record, and provided alternative cleanup approaches that were speculative (p.622). As a result of the cost-effective, caring, and meticulous response undertaken by APL, as well as the insufficient evidence from the defendant, the court deemed APL’s response costs necessary and consistent with the NCP.
Ultimately, the court succinctly references 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(b), which states that PRPs shall be held liable for “necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan”. Using this provision, and having proven all the four aforementioned criteria, the court held that the APL, even as a PRP, can seek reimbursement from Kemira, a proven PRP, over the response costs incurred over the threatened release of ferrous chloride crystals at a facility as these costs abide by the National Contingency Plan.
Dissenting Opinion: None