Link to case: https://casetext.com/case/stewards-v-red-river-coal-co-3

Link to United States Code (2023 edition): https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCODE-2023-title30/USCODE-2023-title30-chap25&collectionCode=USCODE

Please note that the following brief was prepared by a student.

Plaintiff: SOUTHERN APPALACHIAN MOUNTAIN STEWARDS; APPALACHIAN VOICES; SIERRA CLUB

Defendant: RED RIVER COAL COMPANY, INCORPORATED

Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Facts: The plaintiffs are the Southern Appalachian Mountain Stewards, Appalachian Voices, and the Sierra Club. The plaintiffs have brought an action against the defendant, Red River Coal Company, on the basis that they have violated the Surface Mining Act. The plaintiffs allege that the defendant’s currently inactive North Fox Gap Surface Mine in Wise County, Virginia has continued to discharge pollutants into the water sources in its vicinity, violating the standards of the Surface Mining Act.

In the State of Virginia, both the Surface Mining Act (Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act) and Clean Water Act (Federal Water Pollution Control Act) regulate the operations of coal surface mines and their discharge of pollutants into water. The Clean Water Act is enforced by the EPA and particularly concerns the regulation of the discharge of pollutants into United States waters. Some polluters may be exempt from a degree of liability for the pollution of waters if they are granted a permit which allows the permit-holder to discharge a certain amount of pollutants into waters. These permit-holders that pollute are deemed to be in compliance with the Clean Water Act, shielding them from liability. These permits may be granted by the EPA or by states which the EPA has delegated authority to do so, such as Virginia.

Although the Surface Mining Act also originates from federal legislation, states are delegated the power to enforce the act. In states which meet the criteria of the Surface Mining Act, such as Virginia, the state has the ability to “exclusively regulate surface coal mining operations” by creating a permit system that incorporates the “anti-pollution performance standards'' of the act (p. 309). Unlike the Clean Water Act, an operator with a Surface Mining Act permit can still be held liable for their discharge of pollution.

Procedural History: This is an appeal by the plaintiffs from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Big Stone Gap. The case was previously presided over by District Judge James P. Jones in 2017. The plaintiffs initially alleged that the defendants had violated both the Clean Water Act and the Surface Mining Act, along with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976. The plaintiffs brought an action against the defendant on the allegation that there are “discharges of pollutants from point sources at Red River’s now-inactive North Fox Gap Surface Mine in Virginia” (p. 309).

The lower district court granted summary judgment to the defendant with the rationale that the Surface Mining Act included a saving clause which states that nothing in the act “‘shall be construed as superseding, amending, modifying, or repealing... [the Clean Water Act and] the State laws enacted pursuant thereto.’ 30 U.S.C. §1292(a)(3)” (p. 309). The court decided that although the defendant would have been liable under the Surface Mining Act, they are shielded from liability due to their Clean Water Act permit. Thus, to hold the defendant liable under the Surface Mining Act would violate the saving clause of the statute.

The plaintiffs appealed the decision concerning the summary judgment of the Surface Mining Act claim to the circuit court in December 2020 and the case was decided in March 2021. The opinion was drafted by Judge Julius N. Richardson.

Legal Issue: Even when there is no substantive inconsistency between the standards in the Clean Water Act and Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, did the court rule that an inconsistency in scope of liability to be sufficient to evoke the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act’s saving clause as stated in 30 U.S.C. §1292(a)(3)?

Holding: Yes, if an operator’s conduct is shielded from liability under the Clean Water Act, it cannot be held liable for the same conduct under the substantively identical standards of the Surface Mining Act. A discrepancy regarding the scope of liability is sufficient to evoke the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act’s (Surface Mining Act) saving clause, which gives precedence to the Clean Water Act in cases of overlapping regulation.

Rationale: The court affirms the federal circuit court’s decision that the defendants cannot be held liable for the discharge of pollutants under the Surface Mining Act because the defendants are shielded from liability through their Clean Water Act permit. The defendants have a valid permit defense because the Surface Mining Act is subservient in its scope of liability due to its saving clause, which states that nothing in the act can supersede the Clean Water Act. The court succinctly states, “liability may not be imposed under the Surface Mining Act for a specific discharge when the Clean Water Act’s permit shield bars liability under the Clean Water Act for that same discharge” (p. 311).

Although there are no inconsistent substantive standards in the acts, there is an inconsistency in the “scope of liability for violating those standards,” as a Clean Water Act permit shield can prevent an operator from being held liable, while a Surface Mining Act permit does not entail a liability shield (p. 311). Regardless of the inconsistency in the scope of liability, the court stated that even if the acts were substantially inconsistent, such as the Surface Mining Act posed more stringent standards, the possession of a Clean Water Act permit would still shield an operator from liability, despite the actions being regulated by both acts. Hence, the court dismisses the plaintiff’s argument that the defendant should be held liable under the Surface Mining Act standards because they are consistent with the standards of the Clean Water Act. The court restates that the key point is that the Clean Water Act’s permit shield is in conflict with the Surface Mining Act’s lack of a permit shield for the same discharges. This lack of a permit shield in itself is enough to be considered an inconsistency between the two acts that is covered by the saving clause.

Moreover, the court discusses that it was Congress’ intention for the Surface Mining Act to “meet the requirement of other statutes” by the saving clause (p. 313). Therefore, in cases of a “regulatory gap”, the saving clause would not be in effect.

However, since the case at bar concerns a matter that has overlapping regulation, the Clean Water Act clearly takes precedence according to the Surface Mining Act’s saving clause.

The court continues to refute the plaintiffs' arguments. The plaintiffs cited United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 and Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861 in order to argue that there is precedent that a saving clause should be interpreted broadly by the court and that the court should not interpret the law in a way that is self-defeating. However, the court disagreed that these are appropriate precedents for this case and dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims since the cited cases answer different legal questions than the one being asked at bar. The cited cases were about federal interference with the jurisprudence of states and were statute-specific, while the case at bar regards federalism and different statutes. Hence, the court states that it is appropriate here to interpret the saving clause narrowly.

Furthermore, the court rejects the plaintiffs’ argument that interpreting the saving clause in a narrow manner would “destroy” the objectives of the Surface Mining Act. The court states that the Surface Mining Act’s “non-hydraulic performance standards” are still in full force when they do not interfere with any of the statutes listed in the saving clause (p. 315). The court believes that the intention of the Surface Mining Act to broadly “protect society and the environment from the adverse effects of surface coal mining operations” remains intact (p. 315).

The court notes that there are still many areas that the act regulates that do not interact with the Clean Water Act or other statutes. The court calls the plaintiffs’ arguments, “exaggerated parade-of-horribles”, which are beyond the text of the statute (p. 315). The court claims that it is “not unsympathetic to concerns about the purity of the water that Virginians rely on,” but states its duty to fairly interpret legislation (p. 315). The court affirmed the decision of the lower court to grant summary judgment to the defendants regarding the Surface Mining Act Claim.

Dissenting Opinions: None.